Announcement No. 475 of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China

Announcement No. 475 of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China In accordance with relevant provisions of the Regulations on the Administration of Pesticides, the Measures for the Administration of Pesticide Registration, the Measures for the Administration of Pesticide Registration Trials, and other related regulations, the following is hereby announced: Following document review, on-site inspections, and comprehensive evaluations, Nanning Lvdubang Agricultural Science and Technology Co., Ltd. and one other entity have been approved as pesticide registration trial units. Additionally, Shanghai Institute of Pesticide Research Co., Ltd. and one other pesticide registration trial unit have been approved to expand their scope of trials (see Attachment 1), with a validity period of five years. Furthermore, after document review and comprehensive evaluation, certificate information changes have been approved for Suzhou Guochen Biotechnology Co., Ltd. and four other pesticide registration trial units (see Attachment 2). This announcement is hereby made. Attachments: 1. List of Pesticide Registration Trial Units and Their Trial Scope 2. List of Changes to Certificate Information for Pesticide Registration Trial Units Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs September 22, 2021 Attachment 1: List of Pesticide Registration Trial Units and Their Trial Scope Attachment 2: List of Changes to Certificate Information for Pesticide Registration Trial Units

The world is sharing the same heat and cold! With factories in Europe and the U.S. cutting or halting production, Chinese companies are operating at a rate of one day on, six days off—your order may be delayed.

Global temperatures are rising, and so are energy costs! With factories in Europe and the U.S. cutting or halting production, Chinese companies are operating at a “one-on, six-off” pace—meaning one day of operation followed by six days of shutdown. Your orders may be delayed. Summary: After learning that their own factories must operate on a “one-on, six-off” schedule, some business owners lamented: “Rent, wages, deliveries, and taxes can’t possibly follow this pattern, yet production has to.” How, then, are small and medium-sized enterprises expected to survive? Recently, European natural gas prices have surged tenfold, prompting many companies to suspend or reduce output. Affected by soaring energy costs, Yara, a major ammonia producer, announced it will cut its European ammonia capacity by 40%; another fertilizer manufacturer, CF Industries, was forced to shut down two fertilizer plants that rely on natural gas; BASF, Europe’s largest chemical company, warned that rising electricity expenses are weighing heavily on its profits; and copper producer Aurubis AG stated that high energy prices are dragging down its earnings. With upstream industries compelled to scale back or halt production, downstream sectors like the food industry face the looming threat of supply-chain disruptions. Meanwhile, in mainland China, rising prices for thermal coal, natural gas, and other energy sources—coupled with national dual-control policies and environmental regulations—are leading to orderly production cuts and shutdowns across the country. Guangdong: Industrial powerhouses such as Dongguan, Zhongshan, Huizhou, and Foshan have begun implementing power rationing and production curtailments. In Dongguan, factories generally received notices to operate two days and shut down five, while many small and micro-enterprises were ordered to run one day and stop for six. At a well-known cardboard factory in Wangniudun, Dongguan, employees are forced to work in sweltering office spaces without air conditioning, enduring unbearable conditions. In Zhongshan, enterprises below a certain size must operate one day and halt for six, while larger firms follow a two‑on, five‑off schedule; premium‑rated businesses are allowed four days of operation followed by three days of shutdown. In Foshan and Huizhou, companies large and small alike have received notices of power restrictions and production halts, causing significant disruptions to manufacturing. According to an announcement from Guangdong Power Grid, starting September 16, a “two‑on, five‑off” power‑rationing regime will be enforced. During peak‑shaving periods, non‑essential loads must remain below 15% of total demand, with peak‑shaving hours set between 7:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. Failure to comply could result in a 10‑day suspension of operations! Zhejiang: Thermal power plants, textile dyeing facilities, chemical plants, and synthetic fiber producers all ground to a halt. Two thermal power plants in Zhejiang issued notices stating that, due to skyrocketing coal prices reaching 1,450 yuan per ton—with no available supply—they would be forced to implement rolling blackouts. In Shaoxing’s Keqiao district, known globally as the “capital of textile dyeing,” dyeing enterprises began shutting down on the 19th and continued until the 30th—a 12‑day production pause that caught many firms off guard. Jiangsu: Companies widely ordered to operate two days and shut down two. Some areas in Jiangsu have imposed power rationing measures effective September 15, initially scheduled for 15 days. During this period, industrial electricity will be cut, while residential power remains unaffected; half‑month maintenance schedules will be enforced, office air conditioners will be turned off, and street lighting will be reduced by half. Nantong led the way, and other parts of Jiangsu have since joined in. Approximately 2,000 chemical plants are expected to temporarily close. A summary of shutdown schedules circulating from Wujiang District in Jiangsu indicates that most companies are following a “two‑on, two‑off” pattern. In Nantong, some enterprises have announced 17‑day holidays, while in Taizhou, many firms have been instructed to suspend operations from the 16th through the end of the month. In Changzhou, certain companies have been told to halt production for eight days, and in Zhenjiang, paper machines used for printing and packaging have been shut down for 14 days. Amid mounting environmental inspections, dual‑control policies, power rationing, and hazardous‑chemical audits, market concerns about supply-side constraints have intensified, triggering frenzied buying of raw materials. Prices are changing by the second, and manufacturers routinely impose sales caps—leaving businesses desperate and regretful when they fail to secure needed inputs. Against the backdrop of sustained price hikes in traditional energy sources—water, electricity, and gas—dyes and auxiliary chemicals are also seeing sharp increases. Beyond disperse dyes and reactive sulfur dyes, major chemical products such as liquid caustic soda, solid caustic soda, sodium carbonate, and glacial acetic acid have all risen significantly, with shortages already emerging. Although similar power rationing occurred nationwide last December and again in May this year, the sheer scale and duration of this round of restrictions have far exceeded expectations. Many companies had already placed modest orders and even granted extended holidays for the Mid-Autumn Festival—only to find themselves hit by sudden production halts shortly after the holiday ended. Watching raw material prices soar, business owners are left sleepless and deeply worried. With upstream suppliers enjoying concentrated production capacity and thus greater leverage, prolonged shutdowns inevitably drive prices higher. Meanwhile, midstream and downstream manufacturers—numerous and fragmented—can only passively absorb these cost increases. Over the past four months, China’s economy has faced a challenging situation characterized by a widening gap between PPI and CPI, both hitting record highs. With consumer demand still sluggish, the relentless rise in raw-material costs is placing immense pressure on mid- and downstream industries—especially small and medium-sized enterprises, whose survival prospects are increasingly bleak. Upon hearing that their own factories must operate on a “one-on, six-off” schedule, some business owners sighed bitterly: “Rent, wages, deliveries, and taxes can’t possibly follow this pattern, yet production has to. How are SMEs supposed to survive under these circumstances?”

Decarbonization is not about curtailing production capacity, nor is it about disrupting the balance of supply and demand.

Reducing carbon emissions does not mean curtailing production capacity, nor does it mean disrupting the balance between supply and demand. Since the goals of peaking carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality were proposed, they have had a significant impact both domestically and internationally. This reflects China’s responsibility as a responsible major country to the international community, while also embodying the intrinsic requirements of a comprehensive green transformation in our economic and social development. Simply put, this transformation is not something imposed upon us by others; it is a shift we must undertake ourselves. Gradually realizing these goals will bring broad, profound, and long-term impacts on China’s economic and social development. In essence, this will lead to major adjustments in industrial structure, present substantial opportunities for technological innovation and investment, trigger accompanying institutional reforms and innovations, and usher in a systematic, large-scale transformation of lifestyles, modes of production, and development philosophies. Drawing on recent findings from our field research and observations during the implementation of the dual-carbon goals, I would like to discuss three key issues. First, decarbonization cannot be pursued in isolation. Instead, it should proceed in tandem with other priorities—reducing pollution, increasing greenery, and promoting growth—based on China’s current national conditions. After all, China remains fundamentally a developing country, distinct from developed nations. Developed countries have already passed the peak of industrialization; their carbon emissions have peaked, and most environmental pollution problems have been largely resolved. Their economies are predominantly service‑oriented, with generally favorable ecological conditions, and crucially, they have entered a mature stage of economic development. Put simply, “the apple is ripe—you can’t make it grow any faster.” But China is different: beyond carbon emissions, environmental pollution and ecological degradation remain pressing challenges. More importantly, we both need and have the potential to sustain relatively rapid economic growth. Some may wonder whether such an approach could undermine decarbonization efforts. The answer is no—it will actually strengthen them. Consider, for example, the issue of externalities in economics: there are significant differences between the externalities associated with carbon reduction and those related to conventional pollutant control. Take hotels, for instance: they discharge polluted water or air, facing considerable pressure to address these issues, while local residents strongly advocate for remediation. By contrast, the costs of reducing carbon emissions are borne by the emitter itself, while the benefits accrue globally, so enthusiasm tends to be lower. Carbon reduction and conventional pollutant abatement share common origins—both involve emitting the same pollutants. According to Shenzhen’s experience, this overlap exceeds 70–80 percent. Thus, coordinated governance effectively leverages the strong motivation behind pollution control to drive the relatively weaker momentum of carbon reduction, using shared origins to advance both objectives simultaneously. We have observed that Shenzhen has managed this coordination quite well. Similarly, ecological restoration and afforestation can enhance carbon sinks, which in turn help neutralize carbon emissions. Even more importantly, green growth—particularly the development of green technologies—can significantly promote innovation and widespread adoption of high‑productivity, low‑emission, or zero‑emission, cost‑effective green technologies, thereby boosting economic growth while supporting decarbonization, pollution control, and greening efforts. Second, decarbonization must avoid “campaign‑style” approaches. At a recent meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, it was emphasized that campaign‑style reductions should be avoided. Recently, during field visits, some local officials reported intense short‑term pressure to cut emissions, even impacting immediate economic growth. There have also been reports of certain regions implementing power cuts and rationing to meet emission targets—sometimes even in summer, when air conditioning is still needed. While such cases are not widespread, they warrant attention, as they reflect a troubling trend. Another issue is that, at this stage, our primary method of driving emission reductions remains top‑down task allocation and administrative enforcement. Some argue that there may be alternative approaches, but in the short term, this seems to be the only viable option, with no better alternatives currently available. The advantage of this approach is its speed and potential for quick results; however, concerns remain about whether targets are reasonably allocated, whether free‑riding occurs, and whether the overall balance is adequate. It is essential to recognize that achieving the goals of peaking carbon emissions and carbon neutrality hinges on replacing traditional technologies with green ones. The aim is to reduce carbon emissions—not to curtail production capacity, slow economic growth, or artificially disrupt normal supply‑and‑demand dynamics without the necessary green technologies. Throughout this process, we must adhere to the principles of green transformation and market mechanisms; otherwise, even well‑intentioned efforts may fail. As the saying goes, “to break the old, you must first establish the new”—but in the context of green transformation, I believe it should be “no new without the old gone.” This principle was particularly underscored at the recent Financial and Economic Affairs Commission meeting: prioritize establishing new green supply capacities while ensuring industrial supply security to facilitate a smooth transition. Third, decarbonization must avoid misaligned metrics. A contentious issue recently has been whether using dual controls on total energy consumption and energy intensity is an appropriate and effective way to achieve the dual‑carbon goals. During our field research, we found that many local governments currently rely on these dual controls as their main tool for pursuing the dual‑carbon targets. The original intent behind these measures—to encourage energy conservation, improve energy efficiency, and curb excessive energy use—was undoubtedly sound, aiming to support sustained economic and social development with minimal energy consumption. However, two key issues arise when considering their role in achieving the dual‑carbon goals. First, energy conservation does not necessarily equate to carbon reduction. The same amount of energy consumed can result in high‑carbon, low‑carbon, or even zero‑carbon emissions. Our objective is to gradually lower the carbon footprint by adjusting the energy mix—replacing high‑carbon sources with low‑carbon or zero‑carbon alternatives—while ensuring an adequate energy supply. Currently, China’s per capita income has just surpassed $10,000; according to our plans, by 2035 we aim to reach the per capita income level of a middle‑income developed country—roughly $30,000 to $40,000 in today’s dollars. With a per capita income ranging from $10,000 to $30,000–$40,000, there remains considerable room for growth—including in per capita energy consumption, especially electricity usage. If total energy consumption is constrained too severely, it could stifle the necessary pace of economic growth, contradicting the original developmental intent. Second, setting aside issues of carbon emissions and conventional pollutants, the question arises: what is the best approach to managing total energy consumption and intensity—administrative measures or market‑based mechanisms? In this context, dual controls on energy consumption are essentially a matter of cost management. Decisions regarding how and how much to use inputs, including energy, can only be made effectively by the enterprises themselves; government-level macro‑management struggles to grasp such nuances. For example, in recent years, the cost of photovoltaic power generation has dropped dramatically. If a company uses such green electricity to produce a high‑value‑added product, even if its energy consumption is slightly higher, the greater economic returns ultimately make it more cost‑effective overall. We recommend accelerating efforts to replace the dual controls on energy consumption with dual controls on carbon emissions—total carbon emissions and emission intensity—so as to better serve the dual‑carbon goals. Of course, the dual controls on energy consumption still have value as an analytical indicator for assessing economic transformation. As I mentioned earlier, we face several challenges in pursuing the dual‑carbon targets, but we must look further ahead. To address these issues and challenges, we should focus, both now and for the foreseeable future, on laying solid foundations for green transformation—work that will yield long‑term benefits. Therefore, the next priority is to promote two types of innovation: technological innovation and institutional innovation. Fundamentally, achieving carbon peaking and carbon neutrality depends on green technology-driven change—a large‑scale, systematic replacement of older, less environmentally friendly technologies (gray and black technologies) with green alternatives. These green technologies should meet three criteria: high technological content and productivity, low or zero emissions, and strong competitiveness compared to traditional industries, coupled with low costs. Some may think these goals are difficult to attain, but in fact, they are achievable. Take the photovoltaic industry as an example: ten years ago, the idea that photovoltaic power could compete economically with coal‑fired power might have seemed unrealistic. Yet over the past decade, the cost of photovoltaic energy has fallen by 80–90 percent, and today it is already cheaper than conventional coal‑generated electricity. I’ve heard industry insiders suggest that in the coming years, photovoltaic costs could drop even further. Thus, the three objectives I outlined earlier are indeed within reach—and represent the core focus of our next phase of innovation. Previously, the emphasis was on improving productivity; going forward, the priority shifts to low‑carbon, zero‑carbon, and low‑cost solutions. Innovation can enable us to accomplish tasks once thought impossible—or even unattainable—so the center of gravity must shift accordingly. When discussing technological innovation, we must first promote technologies that have reached maturity and demonstrably deliver significant social and economic benefits. At the same time, we need to accelerate the establishment of institutional frameworks and policy environments that incentivize the development and dissemination of green technologies. Historically, the relationship between green innovation and economic growth has often been viewed as conflicting—for instance, some argued that prioritizing environmental protection and green development might hinder economic growth. Such concerns were valid in the past, because our earlier green technologies and innovations focused primarily on subtraction—removing pollution. Moving forward, green technologies should emphasize addition and multiplication—such as the R&D and industrialization of low‑carbon and zero‑carbon innovations—which, according to some studies, could attract investments totaling hundreds of trillions of yuan. Without embracing green development, we cannot unlock this vast potential for growth. Turning to institutional innovation, I would like to raise a fundamental question: in the pursuit of green development, should—and can—the market play a decisive role? At present, objectively speaking, the market still falls far short of fulfilling this role. However, as we enter the green transformation phase under the dual‑carbon goals, we must undertake systemic institutional reforms. With effort, we can lay the groundwork for a micro‑foundation in which the market plays a decisive role. Many tasks lie ahead in this area, beginning with the establishment of carbon accounts and green responsibility accounts. First and foremost, we must advance carbon accounting and ecological accounting. I stress that accounting is the cornerstone of green transformation—whether through administrative or market‑based approaches—because clear records are essential, and a scientifically sound methodology must be established. This is a critical and urgent task, yet it remains a major bottleneck, receiving insufficient attention thus far. Moreover, implementing dual controls on carbon emissions is challenging due to the lack of a necessary accounting foundation. A prominent challenge facing the development of green finance is the issue of defining “green” standards—what exactly qualifies as green? Much of this hinges on the very act of green accounting.I believe that the current level of attention and research progress in green accounting clearly fail to meet the needs of green finance development. Therefore, our next step will be to build upon carbon accounting and ecological accounting: first establishing carbon accounts and ecological accounts, then developing green accounts at all levels—national, provincial, municipal, district, as well as for individual enterprises and individuals—that encompass four key elements: carbon emission reduction, conventional pollutant control, ecological restoration, and economic growth. This approach will help define the green responsibilities borne by each entity, which, from an economic perspective, essentially clarifies property rights and accountability—the foundation for market mechanisms to function effectively. If everyone takes responsibility for their own actions, the world will become much cleaner. We should encourage localities to actively explore and innovate in this area. By implementing green responsibility accounts, we can break down and operationalize national carbon neutrality goals, drive a green transition, and make solid, effective progress. On October 11, the China Pesticide Industry Association will host the 21st National Pesticide Exchange Conference—Fuhua Forum—in Shanghai. During the event, industry leaders and corporate executives will engage in in-depth discussions on "Green Innovation and High-Quality Development of the Pesticide Industry under the 'Dual Carbon Goals'." Stay tuned!

Chen Huiqing, Deputy Secretary of the Zhuzhou Municipal Party Committee and Acting Mayor, paid a visit to Hunan Haohua for an inspection.

Chen Huiqing, Deputy Secretary of the Zhuzhou Municipal Party Committee and Acting Mayor, paid a visit to Hunan Haohua for an inspection.

Song Bao’an: Green pesticides are the key to addressing the problems inherent in China’s traditional agrochemicals.

Song Bao’an: Green pesticides are the key to addressing the problems inherent in China’s traditional pesticide industry. Green pesticides represent a “key” to solving the issues plaguing conventional pesticides. Today, the toxicity of widely used pesticides such as imidacloprid and avermectin to honeybees has drawn global attention, while resistance continues to escalate. Resistance among harmful organisms like rice planthoppers and wild oats is growing exponentially. Meanwhile, China’s pesticide formulations and product types are becoming outdated; despite annual pesticide usage reaching 900,000 tons, traditional pesticides still dominate, with insecticides accounting for a large share. Emulsifiable concentrate formulations comprise more than one-third of all products, and alternative options remain scarce. Furthermore, herbicides such as atrazine, glyphosate, imazethapyr, and tribenuron-methyl have already developed severe resistance against most weeds, warranting widespread concern. In particular, glyphosate resistance has spread rapidly worldwide since 2005, with over 40 weed species now exhibiting serious resistance. In rice paddies, areas where weeds have developed herbicide resistance have reached tens of millions of mu. In light of these challenges facing China’s traditional pesticide sector, Academician Song Bao’an emphasizes that original innovation in green pesticides is crucial for resolving existing problems and holds significant importance for the sustainable and healthy development of China’s pesticide industry. Across the industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has already banned 46 highly toxic and high-risk pesticides and implemented a designated-sales system for existing highly toxic pesticides. Over the next five years, an additional ten highly toxic chemical pesticides will be phased out, gradually removing traditional highly toxic pesticides from the market. Recently, with the release of the latest maximum residue limits for pesticides in food—covering all approved pesticide varieties and major plant-derived agricultural products—the focus on developing green agriculture has been reaffirmed. This calls for intensified original innovation, research, and promotion of efficient, low-toxicity, low-risk pesticides, advancing environmentally friendly and harmless green alternatives. Creating green pesticides remains challenging—so what should receive priority attention going forward? Over the past three decades, China has independently developed more than 20 fungicide varieties, including six microbial and natural-product-based pesticides; 18 insecticide varieties, among which one is derived from natural products; 10 herbicide varieties; and six plant growth regulators. As a result, China has become a country capable of independent pesticide innovation. According to Academician Song Bao’an, technologically advanced nations such as the United States, Germany, and Japan—where multinational agrochemical companies hold a decisive edge in biopesticide competition—are investing substantial resources and manpower into biopesticide R&D. Internationally, cutting-edge trends in biopesticide development include novel formulation research, genetically modified plants, integrated seed–pesticide–fertilizer technologies, and induced resistance mechanisms. Biopesticide research has now entered the realm of molecular biology, with a sharp rise in projects focusing on Bacillus thuringiensis, induced resistance, arthropod-related technologies, and other related areas. Currently, international trends in new pesticide discovery exhibit three main characteristics: First, new biotechnologies are leading the way: frontier life science technologies—such as functional genomics, proteomics, and structural biology—especially disruptive gene-editing techniques, are increasingly intertwined with new pesticide development. Second, bioinformatics applications are gaining traction: emerging technologies like high-performance computing, big data, and artificial intelligence are being applied to accelerate new pesticide discovery, significantly boosting efficiency. Third, multidisciplinary collaboration is advancing: the global agrochemical science landscape has entered a new era, marked by synergistic cross-pollination among disciplines, integration of diverse technologies, and cross-sectoral convergence—all hallmarks of a fresh wave of pesticide innovation. Additionally, Academician Song Bao’an highlights the need to prioritize the development and application of novel, low-risk small-molecule pesticides that regulate plant immunity. These innovative agents can influence, control, and modulate harmful organisms, offering high efficacy and safety while drastically reducing the use of chemical pesticides. Such approaches have become mainstream in agriculture worldwide and will play a pivotal role in future pesticide development. During the 13th Five-Year Plan period, several independently developed small-molecule green pesticides in China obtained official registration and were put into production. Looking ahead, over the next five to ten years, China’s green pesticide innovation efforts will focus on two key areas: First, the creation and industrialization of novel, highly effective biopesticides. By leveraging living microorganisms and active metabolic products as active ingredients, researchers aim to develop safe, efficient, and cost-effective biopesticide varieties, establishing green, high-efficiency manufacturing processes that minimize environmental impact and ensure long-lasting performance. Second, the development and industrialization of green chemical pesticides. Drawing upon databases of natural products and small chemical molecules, researchers will employ AI- and computer-assisted design methods to engineer novel pesticide molecular frameworks. They will also adopt rational drug-design strategies based on target-resistance prediction, thereby reducing risks of resistance and cross-resistance during development and producing highly effective, environmentally safe, green chemical pesticides. The 21st National Pesticide Exchange Conference, scheduled for October 10–12, will feature a keynote address titled “Current Status and Prospects of Innovative Research on Green Agricultural Development,” delivered by Academician Song Bao’an, President of Guizhou University and member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. Stay tuned!